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Daniel M. Wegner
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The Illusion of Conscious Will Paperback – Jan. 1 2003

by Daniel M. Wegner (Author)
4.1 4.1 out of 5 stars 50 ratings
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Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious will, Wegner shows, helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion, it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines the issue from a variety of angles. He looks at illusions of the will?-those cases where people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing or, conversely, are not willing an act that they in fact are doing. He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. The result is a book that sidesteps endless debates to focus, more fruitfully, on the impact on our lives of the illusion of conscious will.
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  1. Print length
    419 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Publisher
    The MIT Press
  4. Publication date
    Jan. 1 2003
  5. Dimensions
    2.54 x 15.24 x 22.86 cm
  6. ISBN-10
    0262731622
  7. ISBN-13
    978-0262731621
  8. See all details
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Product details

  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ The MIT Press (Jan. 1 2003)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Paperback ‏ : ‎ 419 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0262731622
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0262731621
  • Item weight ‏ : ‎ 567 g
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 2.54 x 15.24 x 22.86 cm
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.1 4.1 out of 5 stars 50 ratings

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Daniel M. Wegner

Daniel M. Wegner

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4.1 out of 5 stars
4.1 out of 5
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Top reviews from Canada

Jerry Larock
5.0 out of 5 stars Great book
Reviewed in Canada on April 25, 2019
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Very interesting book on the topic of conscious will. Detailed, informative, often humorous. Similar to anatta of Buddhism.
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John Carter
4.0 out of 5 stars Good, but fails near the end
Reviewed in Canada on October 9, 2002
I loved the way this book started. For example, the evidence that people can feel they are controlling other people's actions is fascinating. The overall theory of how we feel we are willing things is well presented, as is the idea that such a feeling is an illusion. This isn't shocking stuff to some, but to others it will be a huge revelation.
I do have complaints. For the tiny ones first (big one at the end). First, I object to calling the loss of pain and loss of memory during hypnosis examples of increased mental control. By that definition, Alzheimers patients have increased control. What one isn't aware of one isn't aware of and this hardly seems like control.
As far as not being able to avoid thinking of things, it seems to me the explanation is simpler. Words conjure images, but negative words have no images associated with them so when you say "Don't think about a bear" the only word causing an image is bear, and so you think of a bear. Trying to monitor bear thoughts will lead to bear thoughts. Also he says, if you are distracted while you are trying not to do something you will be more likely to do it. I can see that since trying not to do something (like drop a jar) requires action in an opposite direction, i.e. it requires effort. But is this true when you are trying NOT to think of something? If I tried not to think of Wegner's white bear and was then asked to recite the Gettysburg address I strongly suspect I would forget the bear. Not thinking about something, unlike not doing does not require any positive action. Distraction ought to make it easier to forget and he never distinguishes between these and acts as if what is true of behavior is true of thoughts.
But my BIG complaint is the last chapter. He suddenly claims his own theories only explain why we feel will, but he tried to minimize the impact of all this on morality and even started talking about will as a causal force again. He even seemed at times when using the word will to indicate something that wasn't necessarily conscious. This is nonsense. If will isn't conscious it isn't will.
Our thoughts have causal impact on our actions, but then what is the cause of our thoughts? Clearly we don't control these either. They are a sum of what we are, what we have experienced, the way our brains are wired together etc. As far as morality I have to believe that the only thing we can judge is individual bits of behavior. Behavior is moral or not, acceptable or not and some people have a higher propensity to engage in unacceptable behaviors than others--whatever the reasons. As a society we have to judge behavior and engage in activities to modify the behavior of others when it is unacceptable and that is what our jutsice system should attempt. If an individual's behavior remains unacceptable or cannot be modified, we have an obligation to put them where they cannot engage in the behavior.
Wegner is clearly unwilling to give up on the idea that people will their behavior and are thus responbsible in the traditional way for what they do. The idea that we can use "mens rea" a guilty mind to show a person willed their actions seems like a dubious standard to me. A person may not will their behavior but later feels guilty because they realize their behavior is in violation of their own moral code. A person totally lacking a developed moral code (a sociopath, let's say) would never exhibit a guilty mind. Are such folks les guilty? Or less dangerous?
The whole issue of whether mental states should be considered in a legal system should be abandoned as far as I can see. I believe we should judge behavior and then decide what to do with the person engaging in the behavior. What we do should be motivated by our desire to 1) modify the person's behavior and 2) protect innocents. The strategy for each individual will vary depending on their mental abilities and their behavioral history etc and we may often get it wrong.
Wegner's thesis has much bigger implications for our ideas about personal responsibility than he wants to admit and ultimately he is unwilling to really stick with his guns. That was a dissappointment.
But the book has a lot of great stuff to say and I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested in mind/body questions.
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Timothy D. Wilson
5.0 out of 5 stars Fantastic book!
Reviewed in Canada on September 11, 2002
Dan Wegner has done it again. The Illusion of Conscious Will is a brilliant, funny, entertaining, insightful book on a question of fundamental importance to psychology, philosophy, theology, and everyday life: To what extent are we the authors of our own actions? Is there such a thing as conscious will, or is it illusion? If there is conscious will, how would we know it? Wegner shines a bright light on these age-old questions, most importantly by showing that they are open to investigation by the experimental psychologist. Wegner is the rarest of combinations--a brilliant theorist, ingenious experimenter, and wonderful writer. This book is a must read.
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Eli Ticatch
5.0 out of 5 stars Great Read!!
Reviewed in Canada on April 23, 2002
The Illusion of Conscious Will will radically change your view of human behavior, including your own. It manages to controvert the most basic of our intuitive assumptions about our actions and decisions -- that they are governed by our conscious thought processes. Wegner presents ample anecdotal and scientific evidence to suggest that what we call consciousness is just a byproduct of our underlying, unconscious decision making process. And, what is more, he does so with an entertaining and readily accessible writing style. A great read for anyone who is interested in learning why they do what they do!
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R. M. Williams
4.0 out of 5 stars brain research discusses conscious will with a psychologist
Reviewed in Canada on March 5, 2003
I found the book via on online discussion group, as such it is not in a field that i feel particularly able to judge the quality of the work, or where it fits into the overall field.
The book is an extended discussion of the question: "do we consciously cause what happens to us? or as the author puts the question- is the experience of consciously willing an action and the causation of the action by the person's conscious mind the same thing?" pg.3 The book feels like a dialogue between a psychologist and a brain researcher with a philosopher as umpire. The overall structure of the book is particularly good as the author avoids the great temptation to stray from his point while he investigates weird and interesting behaviors, it is to his great credit that the book makes good sense and continues to hammer away at his main point. All the while exploring related avenues of information that might have derailed the study.
The book, at least for me with my limited background in the issues, is rather self authenticating. So i would like to share several very good quotes:
"The real and apparent casual sequences relating thought and action probably do tend to correspond with each other some proportion of the time. After all, people are pretty good information processors when given access to the right information. The occurrence of conscious intention prior to action is often wonderful information because it provides a fine clue as to how things that are on the person' mind might pertain to what the person does. In fact, the mental system that introduces throughts of action to mind and keeps them coordinated with the actions is itself an intriguing mechanism. However, if conscious will is an experience that arises from the interpretation of clues to cognitive casuality, then apparent mental causation is generated by an interpretive process that is fundamentally separate from the mechanistic process of real mental causation. The experience of will can be an indication that mind is causing action, especially if the person is a good self-interpreter, but it is not conclusive." pg 96
"The phenomena of dissociative identity disorder reminds us that our familiar subjective sense of being and doing are open to remarkable transformations. The self is not locked into place somewhere an inch or so behind our eyes, a fixture in the mind. Rather, the agent self is a fabrication put in place by the mechanisms of thought, a virtual agent that has experiences and feels as though it is doing things but that could conceivably be replaced by some other virtual agent that is implemented in the same mind. The experience of consciously willing an action is something that happens in a virtual agent, not in a brain or mind. The sense of being an agent creates our sense of subjective self and identity." pg 263
"Conscious will is the somatic marker of personal authorship, an emotion that authenticates the action's owner as the self. With the feeling of doing an act, we get a conscious sensation of will attached to the action. Often, this marker is quite correct. In many cases, we have intentions that preview our action, and we draw causal inferences linking our thoughts and actions in ways that track quite well our own psychological processes. Our experiences of will, in other words, often do correspond correctly with the empirical will--the actual casual connection between our thought and action. The experience of will then serves to mark the moment and in memory the actions that have been singled out in this way. We know them as ours, as authored by us, because we have felt ourselves doing them. This helps us to tell the difference between things we're doing and all the other things that are happening in and around us. In the melee of actions that occur in daily life, and in the social interaction of self with others, this body-based signature is a highly useful tool. We resonate with what we do, whereas we only notice what otherwise happens or what others have done. Thus, we can keep track of our own contributions without pencils or tally sheets." pg 327
And from the concluding page, 342, " Sometimes how things seem is more important than what they are. This is true in theater, in art, in used car sales, in economics, and -- it now turns out-- in the scientific analysis of conscious will. The fact is, it seems to each of us that we have conscious will . It seems we have selves. It seems we have minds. It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do. Although it is sobering and ultimately accurate to call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the illusory is trivial. On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent mental causation are the building blocks of human psychology and social life. It is only with the feeling of conscious will that we can being to solve the problems of knowing who we are as individuals, of discerning what we can and cannot do, and of judging ourselves morally right or wrong for what we have done."
From these you can conclude for yourself the author's position on the question of the book. From them as well you can determine the quality of the writing and the level of the argumentation. For my part, i found the time i spent understanding the author's argument constructive, the examples illuminating and most interesting, despite being a scientific writing it held my interest and was emotionally as well as intellectually fulfilling. I hope you find it likewise.
thanks for reading the review, i would certainly invite recommendation for further reading on this topic. send to [local website]
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Leon
5.0 out of 5 stars A must read if you are interested in neuroscience
Reviewed in Spain on September 16, 2019
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This book takes you to the nuts and bolts of neuroscience.
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Anthony Campbell
5.0 out of 5 stars The free will paradox in the light of experiment.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 19, 2018
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Debates about free will have traditionally been a matter for philosophers, but advances in experimental psychology and neurophysiology now mean that science is altering the terms of the argument. Wegner draws on this information to put forward the view encapsulated by his title: namely, that the feeling of willing is an illusion.

The first thing to say about this book is that it is refreshingly free from jargon. Wegner writes well and clearly and there are numerous witty asides. As an added bonus there are genuine footnotes at the bottom of the page instead of the usual tiresome end notes; congratulations to MIT Press for these.

Research in the 1960s showed that there are measurable electrical changes in the brain in the run-up to a voluntary movement such as lifting a finger. Some regarded this as evidence for the input of a conscious self. However, later work by Benjamin Libet produced the disconcerting information that electrical brain activity begins before the person is conscious of the decision to move. The obvious implication is that consciousness appears to be an epiphenomenon or accompaniment to action rather than its originator.

The essence of the view that Wegner wants to defend is encapsulated in a diagram on p.68. This shows both conscious thought and action as arising from unknown events in the brain. There are two pathways leading to action: the "real" but unconscious pathway that produces the action, and a second "apparent" pathway that produces the illusion of conscious initiation of action.

This counterintuitive view is explained in the first few chapters, and the remainder of the book expands the idea with reference to various unusual psychological states such as automatic writing, mediumship and channelling, and hypnosis. Wegner shows that it is possible to think one is willing an action when one is not and also to will an action when one thinks one isn't. These strange situations come about because conscious will is, in fact, an illusion, and hence the brain can be tricked into thinking that will is present when it isn't or vice versa.

If Wegner is right— and he certainly makes a very persuasive case for his view— the implications are clearly pretty disturbing. What are we to make of our ordinary ideas of responsibility, justice, retribution and so on? And why does this illusion of conscious will exist anyway? The philosophical aspectes of the theory are treated, albeit rather briefly, in the final chapter.

Wegner compares the conscious will to a ship's compass. The compass does not directly control the movement of the ship but it is nevertheless essential for navigation. This is an interesting metaphor, but of course one could say that the compass is linked indirectly to the steering via the brain of the helmsman. However, Wegner's argument, as I understand it, is that there is no necessary connection between the compass reading and the movement of the ship. I suppose one could contrast the compass with the automatic pilot of an aircraft, which does control how the plane flies.

Free will, Wegner suggests, is best thought of as an emotion. "The experience of will marks our actions for us. It helps us to know the difference between a light we have turned on at the switch and a light that has flickered on without our influence… Will is a kind of authorship emotion." The feeling of willing, it seems, is an illusion but a necessary one.

Many philosophers have reached the same conclusion as Wegner does in this book. The difference is that they support their arguments with abstract reasoning whereas Wegner does so with direct experimental evidence.
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Giulio Zanni
4.0 out of 5 stars Un'altra illusione dissolta come neve al sole
Reviewed in Italy on April 19, 2017
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Un libro per riflettere sulle nostre convinzioni più salde e su come esse poggino su fragili fondamenta. La questione della volontà cosciente vista in tutte le sue sfaccettature.
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Richehomme
5.0 out of 5 stars Parfait
Reviewed in France on June 12, 2012
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Le livre a été délivré rapidement et est en parfait état hormis l'étiquette "ex libris" qui a été partiellement arrachée pour préserver l'anonymat du précédent propriétaire. Totale satisfaction
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Nicolas S.
5.0 out of 5 stars Außergewöhnlich lesenswerte empirische Untersuchung der Willensfreiheit
Reviewed in Germany on May 13, 2007
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Verursachen wir bewusst unsere Handlungen oder passieren sie uns? Philosophen, Psychologen, Neurologen, Theologen und Rechtswissenschaftler haben lange über die Existenz des freien Willens im Gegensatz zum Determinismus diskutiert. Professor Daniel M. Wegner der Universität Harvard bietet in diesem Buch ein neuartiges Verständnis dieser Frage. Wie Handlungen auch, so argumentiert er, wird das Gefühl bewussten Willens durch Geist und Gehirn erzeugt. Wenn aber psychische und neurale Mechanismen für alles menschliche Verhalten verantwortlich sind, wie können wir dann bewussten Willen haben? Daniel M. Wegner zeigt, dass uns das Gefühl bewussten Willens hilft, unsere Urheberschaft bei Dingen zu erkennen, die unser Geist und unser Körper tun, und diese Urheberschaft zu erinnern. Wir fühlen, dass wir unsere Handlungen bewusst wollen, uns aber unsere Handlungen gleichzeitig passieren. Auch wenn bewusster Wille eine Illusion ist, dient er als ein Anhaltspunkt dafür, uns selbst zu verstehen und ein Gefühl von Verantwortung und Moral zu entwickeln.

Daniel M. Wegner nähert sich bewusstem Willen als Gegenstand psychologischer Untersuchung und betrachtet die Frage von Vielfältigen Blickwinkeln. Er untersucht die Illusion des Willens anhand von Fällen, bei denen Menschen fühlen, dass sie eine Handlung wollen, die sie tatsächlich nicht tun, oder umgekehrt, dass sie eine Handlung nicht wollen, die sie tatsächlich tun. Er erforscht bewussten Willen bei der Hypnose, bei Oui-ja-boards, bei automatischem Schreiben und bei gestützter Kommunikation (facilitated communication), wie auch bei Phänomenen wie Besessenheit, dissoziativen Persönlichkeitsstörungen und Channeling. Das Buch "The Illusion of Conscious Will" weicht endlosen Debatten aus, um die Wirkungen der Illusion des bewussten Willens auf unser Leben in den Fokus zu stellen.

"The Illusion of Conscious Will" ist ein außergewöhnlich lesenwertes Fachbuch für all diejenigen, die sich mit dem Phänomen der Willensfreiheit und der Funktionsweise des menschlichen Gehirns beschäftigen. Ebenso werden zahlreiche spirituelle Phänomene entmystifiziert. Anhand exzellenter empirischer Analysen zeigt Daniel M. Wegner, warum es sich bei der Willensfreiheit um eine sehr nützliche Illusion handelt. Gleichzeitig zeigt er, warum die Erfahrung bewussten Willens nicht als Beweis für die Existenz des freien Willens herangezogen werden kann. Als empirisches und weniger philosophisches Werk bietet es eine hervorragende wissenschaftliche Grundlage für die weitere Diskussion klassischer philosophische Fragestellungen, sodass gerade auch Philosophen diesem Werk große Beachtung schenken sollten.
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