Summary of The Role of Institutional Investors in Curbing Corporate Short-Termism
Brookings Institution, 2015
Activist minority shareholders loudly press corporations to bump up short-term earnings, but that approach often endangers long-term value creation.
“Corporate short-termism” – the penchant of markets, investors and the media to score corporations strictly by their quarterly earnings reports – keeps publicly traded companies from creating sustainable long-term value. Minority-owner hedge funds loudly press for stock price boosts, while majority-owner institutional investors remain largely silent, failing to exercise their ample ownership clout. Finance executive Robert C. Pozen offers ideas on how to battle corporate short-termism in this instructive article on a topic that receives much less coverage than it deserves. getAbstact recommends it to anyone concerned about the impacts of short-term corporate decision making.
In this summary, you will learn
- What role activist hedge funds play in promoting “corporate short-termism,”
- Why institutional investors rarely oppose them or advocate for longer-term approaches, and
- What regulators and others can do to encourage a more active role for institutional investors in proxy voting.
About the Author
Robert C. Pozen, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a former chairman of MFS Investment Management and a former vice-chairman of Fidelity Investments.
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